What explains the skew where Clients/Products/Business Practices drive 73% of loss dollars but only 41% of events. What exposures are at work?
Also, why there is so few Business Disruptionand System Failures and Damage to Assets in the total portfolio?
How to distinguish the categories between Clients, Products & Business Practices vs Execution, Delivery & Process Management? I think they two can both hurt customers and trigger charges.
The near-zero exposure in “Business Disruption and System Failures” is surprising given how digitalized most banks are today. Could this reflect underreporting, strong IT resilience, or simply a lack of recognition of technology-related losses in operational risk frameworks?
Internal frad shows up a lot in count (25%) but barely in dollars (1.6%). Do we treat that as “controlled and low severity,” or is it a warning sign that we have cultural / control weaknesses that could eventually lead to a big single-event loss?
The chart shows that most of the bank’s losses come from “Clients, Products & Business Practices,” meaning the biggest exposures are created through how products are designed, sold, or managed, not from system failures or physical losses. These exposures often come from client interaction, such as unclear product terms or incentive-driven mis-selling. This pattern suggests a structural exposure in decision-making and product governance rather than in operations. It raises the question for me, do we really understand which parts of this broad category drive the losses such as client communication, product features, or incentive systems?
I think one key insight is that risk management often fails not because of lack of tools or data, but because of fragmentation and ambiguity across departments. A unified RMF could help banks actually link exposure identification, containment, and recovery into one coherent system.
What explains the skew where Clients/Products/Business Practices drive 73% of loss dollars but only 41% of events. What exposures are at work?
Also, why there is so few Business Disruptionand System Failures and Damage to Assets in the total portfolio?
How to distinguish the categories between Clients, Products & Business Practices vs Execution, Delivery & Process Management? I think they two can both hurt customers and trigger charges.
The near-zero exposure in “Business Disruption and System Failures” is surprising given how digitalized most banks are today. Could this reflect underreporting, strong IT resilience, or simply a lack of recognition of technology-related losses in operational risk frameworks?
Internal frad shows up a lot in count (25%) but barely in dollars (1.6%). Do we treat that as “controlled and low severity,” or is it a warning sign that we have cultural / control weaknesses that could eventually lead to a big single-event loss?
The chart shows that most of the bank’s losses come from “Clients, Products & Business Practices,” meaning the biggest exposures are created through how products are designed, sold, or managed, not from system failures or physical losses. These exposures often come from client interaction, such as unclear product terms or incentive-driven mis-selling. This pattern suggests a structural exposure in decision-making and product governance rather than in operations. It raises the question for me, do we really understand which parts of this broad category drive the losses such as client communication, product features, or incentive systems?
I think one key insight is that risk management often fails not because of lack of tools or data, but because of fragmentation and ambiguity across departments. A unified RMF could help banks actually link exposure identification, containment, and recovery into one coherent system.
Jiazheng(Jason)Yuan